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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The courts have consistently held that the "instrument" need
not be negotiable .2  Thus, the procedure has been held available to
the holder, of an unconditional guaranty of a note.29 A more recent
and, perhaps, significant extension of the application of section 3213
is to be found in Baker v. Gundermann,30 holding that a letter for-
warded to the plaintiff would qualify as an instrument under the
section. Conversely, the courts have refused invocation of the
accelerated procedure where the determination would depend upon
proof of facts outside' the instrument itself. An early clarification
held that the remedy of summary judgment in lieu of a complaint
did not lie upon an action "to recover security, deposited under
the terms of a lease." "1 So too, under 3213, it has- been held that
in an action to recover monies paid because of alleged ecfiomc
duress, pursuant to a oprepayment clause in a moitgage, plaintift
must serve a formal complaint before -moving for a summary
judgment. 32
A recent case has extended the scope of section 3213 into thie
matrimonial area. In Orenstein v. Orenstein," the Civil Court,
Queens County, was confronted with the substantive issue 0f
whether a separation agreement may serve as a basis for* 3213
relief. The court held a separation' agreement, the'terms- of which
were absolute, specific and unconditional, to be an "inistrxfient for
the payment of money only" within the confines of the statute.
In view of the tenor of prior decisions and the policy 6rientted
approach 11 adopted by the court, such a construction would seem
to be a rational extension of this motion device compatible With
legislative intent.
CPLR 3213: Words "instrument for the paymnent of money oniy'
liberally construed.
The continued expansion of CPLR 3213 35 is evidenced. by the
recent case of Mike Nasti Sand Company v. Almar Landscaping
28 Louis Sherry Ice Cream Co. v. Kroggel, 42 Misc. 2d 21, 245 NY.S.2d
755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963); Channel Excavators, -Inc. v.* Amato
Trucking Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 429, 264 N.Y.S.2d 98"7 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1965).
29 M. Gilston, Inc. v. Ullman, 45 Misc. 2d 6, 255 N.Y.S.2d 747, (Dist.
Ct. Nassau County 1965).
3052 Misc. 2d 639, 276 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County .1966).
-Embassy Indus., Inc. v. SML Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 91, 256 N.Y.S.2d
495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966)..
32 Burnell v. Peoples Say. Bank of Yonkers, 54 Misc. .2d 140, .281
N.Y.S.2d 960 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1967).
358 Misc. 2d 377, 295 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1968).
34 In view of the liberal policy of extending the benefits of 3213 -it -would
appear to be implicit in the court's emphasis upon public policy that, when
confronted with an ambiguous situation, it would be disposed to allow relief,
"See 7B McKINiEY's CPLR 3213, commentary 817 (1963),.- .
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
Corp.0 The proceeding was upon motion by the plaintiff for order
to renew and for leave to reargue a prior motion for summary
judgment in lieu of a complaint. The underlying action was
founded upon a subcontract wherein the plaintiff agreed to supply
snow removal equipment for the defendant pursuant to which plain-
tiff was to be paid a certain amount as rental upon receipt by
defendant of such amount from the port authority.
In granting the motion and reordering judgment pursuant
thereto for plaintiff, the court was confronted with the issue of
whether the agreement constituted an "instrument for the payment
of money only." The defendant contended that an "instrument
for the payment of money only" as described in 3213 must be a
negotiable instrument. Citing established authority to the con-
trary,3 7 the court proceeded to find the instrument complete as to
the time and amount payable, independent of extrinsic facts and
thus within the purview of the statute. Quoting from Kratzenstein
v. Lehnzan,38 the court reasoned that where it appears that the
principal object of the instrument is to assure the payment of a
sum certain upon a fully executed consideration, the only thing
remaining to complete the contract being the payment of money,
such may be said to be an "instrument for the payment of money
only."
While the instrument is thus clearly one for the payment of
money, is it, nevertheless, of that species the terms of which are
absolute, specific and unconditional ?39 Insofar as resort need not
be had to extrinsic facts in order to establish a prima facie case,
the facile relief afforded under 3213 should be available.
While Nasti represents a viable extension of 3213, the practi-
tioner is advised to watch for appellate developments in the area.
:3157 Misc. 2d 550, 293 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
37 No cases are to be found limiting the application of 3213 relief to
negotiable instruments. See Louis Sherry Ice Cream Co. v. Kroggel, 42
Misc. 2d 21, 245 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). Such a
construction would seem contrary to the liberal policy underlying the section,
i.e., to produce a broad base for those actions, presumptively meritorious,
calling for dispatch.
31 19 App. Div. 228, 230, 46 N.Y.S. 71, 72 (1st Dep't 1897). Cf. Adler v.
Bloomingdale, 8 N.Y. Super. Ct. (1 Duer) 601 (1852) wherein the court
limits application of these words, found in the Revised Code of 1851, to
situations in which the instrument is, upon its face, free from any condi-
tion or contingency. See also Orenstein v. Orenstein, 58 Misc. 2d 377, 295
N.Y.S.2d 116 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1968).
3 This factor would seem to be of controlling importance. See, e.g.,
Burnell v. Peoples Sav. Bank, 54 Misc. 2d 140, 281 N.Y.S.2d 960 (App. T.
2d Dep't 1967); Lopez v. Perry, 53 Misc. 2d 445. 278 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1967); Estate of Silverman, 43 Mi$c, Zd 675, 252 N.Y.S.2d
,14 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964),
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